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Abstract:
This paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan. If the
project is expedited, a reward arises. Analogously, a penalty arises if the project is delayed. This paper considers the
case of arbitrary monotonic reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay, respectively. Attention
is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative
project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward (penalty). In the deﬁnition of project games,
surplus (cost) sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the speciﬁc characteristics of the reward (penalty)
function at hand. It turns outs that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games. This relation allows
us to establish the nonemptiness of the core of project games.
Keywords: Project planning, delay, expedition, cost sharing mechanism, surplus sharing mechanism, bankruptcy
problems, taxation problems, cooperative game, core.
JEL classiﬁcation: C71
1 Introduction
A project consists of a set of activities, which interconnections are known, being completed over a period of
time and intended to achieve a particular aim. The project time is the minimum time needed to end all the
activities in a project. A good planning of a project is important to reduce the project time. Two important
methods to schedule and coordinate the activities in a project are the PERT (Program Evaluation Review
∗The author thanks to Ren´ e van der Brink, Harold Houba, Gerard van der Laan and Ines Lindner for their comments and
suggestions on a ﬁrst version of this paper. Special thanks go to Peter Borm and Herbert Hamers for their encouragement and
their helpful discussion and comments.
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1Technique) and the CPM (Critical Path Method). Although PERT has represented a big advance in the
ﬁeld of project management, many issues have been addressed during the last decades as the question of
assessing the project success in Pinto and Slevin (1988) and Tubig and Abeti (1990), the role of research
in projects in Sherwin and Isenson (1967), behavioral functions in technology-based innovative projects in
Roberts and Fusfeld (1981), the classiﬁcation of projects in types depending on the management style in
Shenhar and Dvi (1996), the search of adequate success criteria for project management in Atkinson (1999)
and the study of project scheduling with resource constrains in Dorndorf, Pesch and Phan-Huy (2000) and
M¨ ohring, Schulz, Stork and Uetz (2003).
An important issue while planning a project is the estimation of the time of the diﬀerent activities. In
many real-life situations the estimated duration and the duration after realization (or real duration) of an
activity may diﬀer and as a result the real duration of the project may not coincide with its planned duration.
Usually, a penalty (reward) arises if a project is delayed (expedited). Two motivating examples are given
below.
A usual case of penalties associated to delayed projects can be found in the building of a house. When
a company is hired to build a house, there is usually a clause in the contract in which a penalty for the
company is agreed upon if the house is ﬁnished later than planned. If the company has contracted out some
specialized jobs to other ﬁrms, and these ﬁrms have incurred some delay, it is important to know for which
part of the penalty these ﬁrms can be hold responsible.
An example of rewards associated to expedited projects can be found in projects ordered by a government.
During the term of oﬃce of a government, it has been decided to build a new hospital in a city. For political
reasons (e.g. the approach of new elections), the government wants it to be ﬁnished before the planned time.
As an incentive, a bonus is promised if the works are expedited. In such a case it is important to know which
activities (and therefore the companies involved in such activity) are responsible of the ﬁnal expedition in
order to allocate the bonus.
In practice, activities are often entrusted to diﬀerent companies. If the project is delayed or expedited,
an allocation problem arises: how to share the penalty (in case of delay) or the reward (in case of expedition)
among the various activities and its corresponding companies. Cooperative games are a mathematical tool
to provide an answer to this type of allocation problems. The focus of our study will be on deﬁning a game
in an adequate way and analyzing the corresponding core. The core of a game (Gillies (1953)) provides
allocations of the total penalty or the total reward that are stable, i.e. no group of activities can reasonably
object to allocations in the core. The interaction between operations research and cooperative game theory
already goes back to the seventies, for a survey on the topic see Borm, Hamers and Hendrickx (2001).
The main focus in the literature on project problems has been on delayed project problems. Branzˆ ei,
Ferrari, Fragnelli and Tijs (2002) study delayed project problems in the framework of taxation problems and
2propose a speciﬁc allocation rule. Berganti˜ nos and S´ anchez (2002), analyze two other allocation rules for
delayed project problems. A common feature in these papers is however that game theoretical aspects are
only indirectly present in analyzing the allocation problem at hand. Est´ evez-Fern´ andez, Borm and Hamers
(2007) is the ﬁrst paper to approach the related allocation problem from a direct game theoretical point
of view. Moreover, Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007) is the ﬁrst article where both delayed and expedited
project problems are analyzed. Still, the paper is restricted to project problems where the penalty (reward)
function is proportional with respect to the total delay (expedition) of the project. An important aspect of
Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007) is that it provides the tools to obtain “fair” allocations of the corresponding
penalty or reward by explicitly considering the structure of the project, i.e. the interconnections among the
diﬀerent activities.
In this paper, we extend the work in Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007) by analyzing project problems with
arbitrary but monotonic penalty and reward functions. As in Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007), this is done by
deﬁning project games associated to project problems and considering the corresponding core as the solution
set to the underlying allocation problem. Here, two stages are needed to deﬁne project games for monotonic
penalty (reward) functions. In the ﬁrst stage cost (surplus) sharing problems are used. As a ﬁrst approach
to share the penalty (reward) of a project, we look at each path in the project separately and we share
the penalty (reward) that the path can be held responsible of among its activities by making use of a cost
(surplus) sharing mechanism which is chosen by taking into account the speciﬁc characteristics of the penalty
(reward) function at hand. In this ﬁrst stage, the total amount shared among all the activities may exceed
the total penalty (reward) of the project, hence a second stage is needed to exactly obtain allocations of
the total penalty (reward). In the second stage, a project game is deﬁned in the spirit of Est´ evez-Fern´ andez
et al. (2007) using the allocations obtained in the ﬁrst stage.
For clarity of exposition, we have divided our study on project problems in three parts. First, we study
delayed project problems, which are project problems in which the project has been delayed and none of
the activities has been expedited. Second, we analyze expedited project problems, where a project has been
expedited and none of the activities has been delayed. To conclude, we turn our attention to general project
problems, in which activities in a project may be either delayed or expedited, possibly bringing a diﬀerence
on the overall planned time for the project.
Our main result is that project games have a nonempty core. Moreover, it turns out that the games
associated to delayed project problems can be described as the maximum of as many taxation games as
paths in the project. On the other hand, the games associated to expedited project problems are convex and
can be described as the maximum of a number of bankruptcy games (see O’Neill (1982)).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls some basic notions from project problems, cost
and surplus sharing problems, cooperative games, and bankruptcy and taxation problems. Sections 3 and 4
3are dedicated to delayed project problems and expedited project problems, respectively. Section 5 analyzes
general project problems. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Projects
A project consists of a set of activities for which the inter-connections are known. These activities are
completed over a period of time and intended to achieve a particular aim. Let N denote the set of activities
of a project. Given an activity i ∈ N, let Pi denote the set of predecessors of i, i.e. the set of activities that
have to be processed before i can start. Analogously, let Fi be the set of followers of i, i.e. the set of activities
that need i to be completed before starting. A project is deﬁned as a collection of ordered subsets of N or
paths, {N1,...,Nm}, where a bijection σa : {1,...|Na|} → Na describes the order in Na, a ∈ {1,...,m},




(ii) Fσa(|Na|) = ∅, Pσa(1) = ∅, and Pσa(r) = {σa(1),...,σa(r − 1)} for every a ∈ {1,...,m} and every
r ∈ {2,...,|Na|};
(iii) for a,b ∈ {1,...,m}, if i,j ∈ Na ∩ Nb with σ−1
a (i) < σ−1
a (j), then σ
−1
b (i) < σ
−1
b (j).
Throughout, there is no speciﬁc need to explicitly keep track of the ordering. Therefore, σ1,...,σm are
suppressed from the notations.
Note that a project can be represented by a directed graph where the set of arcs corresponds to the set of
activities. In order to avoid multiple arcs, dummy activities are introduced in the graph (a dummy activity
is an activity that does not consume neither time nor resources). Dummy activities are represented by a
dashed arc.





Table 1: Predecessors of activities in Example 2.1.
4Here, the set of activities is N = {A,B,C} and the collection of paths is {N1,N2}, with N1 = {A,C},






Figure 1: Representation of the project given in Table 1.
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Associated to a project {N1,...,Nm}, there is a duration function l : N → R+ with l(i) denoting
the length or duration of activity i ∈ N. Given a project {N1,...,Nm} and a duration function l, we
deﬁne the duration of a path Na according to l, D(Na,l), as the sum of the duration of its activities, i.e.
D(Na,l) =
 
i∈Na l(i). The duration of the project according to l, D(l), is the maximum duration of its paths,
i.e. D(l) = max1≤a≤m {D(Na,l)}. The slack of Na according to l, slack(Na,l), is the maximum time that the
activities of Na can be delayed without altering the duration of the project, i.e. slack(Na,l) = D(l)−D(Na,l).
We say that a path is critical if it has slack zero.
Example 2.2. Consider the project given in Example 2.1 and let l : N → R+ be given by l(A) = 15,




Table 2: Duration and slack of the paths in Example 2.2. 3
Throughout, we use a ﬁxed notation for two speciﬁc duration functions. We denote by p : N → R+ the
function representing the planned or estimated time of the activities and by r : N → R+ the function giving
the real time of the activities after the realization of the project. We deﬁne the delay function d : N → R+
as d(i) = (r(i) − p(i))+(:= max{r(i) − p(i),0}), i.e. d(i) represents the delay of activity i. Analogously, we
deﬁne the expedition function e : N → R+ as e(i) = (p(i) − r(i))+, i.e. e(i) represents the expedition of
activity i.
Example 2.3. Consider the project given in Example 2.1; let the planned time p : N → R+ be given by
p(A) = 15, p(B) = 10, and p(C) = 8, and let the real time r : N → R+ be given by r(A) = 16, r(B) = 3,
and r(C) = 10. The delay and expedition functions are given in Table 3. 3
5A B C
d(i) (16 − 15)+ = 1 (3 − 10)+ = 0 (10 − 8)+ = 2
e(i) (15 − 16)+ = 0 (10 − 3)+ = 7 (8 − 10)+ = 0
Table 3: Delay and expedition functions in Example 2.3.
2.2 Cost sharing and surplus sharing problems
A cost sharing problem is deﬁned by a tuple (N,q,c) where N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of agents (or players),
q ∈ RN
+ is a vector of nonnegative numbers, with qi representing the demand of agent i ∈ N, and c : R → R+
is a nondecreasing cost function satisfying c(t) = 0 for t ≤ 0. A cost sharing mechanism on a class of cost




i∈N yi(N,q,c) = c(
 
i∈N qi), satisfying that if qi = 0, then yi(N,q,c) = 0.
Several mechanisms can be found in the literature (see e.g. Koster (1999)); we recall here one of the most
studied cost sharing mechanisms in the literature, the serial cost sharing mechanism, ys. Let (N,q,c) be a
cost sharing problem and assume without loss of generality that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ ... ≤ qn, then the serial cost















j=1qj +(n − k + 1)qk) − c(
 k−2
j=1qj +(n − k + 2)qk−1)
n − k + 1
for every i∈N\{1}.





0 if t ≤ 0;
t2 + 100, if t > 0.
In this case, c(2 + 5 + 6) = 269 and ys(N,q,c) = (451
3,991
3,1241
3). Table 4 summarizes the computation of
the serial cost sharing rule.
t c(t)
3q1 = 6 136
q1 + 2q2 = 12 244






















2 = 54 25
1 = 25 1241
3
Table 4: Computation of the cost sharing rule in Example 2.4. 3
Analogously to cost sharing problems, one can think of surplus sharing problems. All deﬁnitions given
above for cost sharing problems can easily be translated to surplus sharing problems.
62.3 TU games
A cooperative (TU) game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N,v) where N is a ﬁnite set of
players and v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0. In general, v(S) represents the value of coalition S, i.e. the joint
payoﬀ that can be obtained by this coalition when its members decide to cooperate.
A cooperative game can reﬂect costs or rewards. A game reﬂecting costs is denoted by a map c, while a
game reﬂecting rewards is denoted by a map v.
The core of a game (N,v) is deﬁned by







xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2
N},
i.e. the core is the set of eﬃcient allocations of v(N) to which no coalition can reasonably object. An important
subclass of games with nonempty core is the class of convex games (see Shapley (1971)). A game (N,v) is
said to be convex if v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T) for every i ∈ N and every S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i}.





for all S ⊂ N.
The properties and solutions concepts for cooperative cost games can consequently be derived from the
above deﬁnitions. The equivalent of a convex game for a cost game is a concave game.
2.4 Bankruptcy and taxation problems
A bankruptcy problem is deﬁned by a tuple (N,E,c) where N = {1,...,n} is the set of agents (or players),
E is the estate that must be shared among the agents, and c ∈ RN is the vector of claims of the agents,
satisfying
 
i∈N ci > E. Bankruptcy problems have being ﬁrstly studied from a game theoretical viewpoint










for every S ⊂ N. In Curiel et al. (1987) it is shown that bankruptcy games are convex.
Taxation problems can be seen as dual of bankruptcy problems. A taxation problem is deﬁned by a tuple
(N,E,c) where N = {1,...,n} is the set of agents (or players), E is the tax that must be collected among
the agents, and c ∈ RN is the vector of the abilities to pay of the players, satisfying
 
i∈N ci > E. Given a








7for every S ⊂ N. In Branzˆ ei et al. (2002) it is shown that taxation games are concave.
3 Delayed project games
A delayed project problem arises when the planned time of the activities in a project was underestimated,
incurring delay of the project. Associated to the delay of the project, there is a non-decreasing penalty
function K : R → R+ satisfying K(t) = 0 for every t ≤ 0. A delayed project problem can be described by a
4-tuple ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,K), where p and r satisfy p ≤ r.
When a penalty forms due to the delay of the project, one can think of sharing the delay of the project
among the activities in a ﬁrst (linear) stage and allocating the (possibly nonlinear) penalty among the activ-
ities according to the delay they have been held responsible of in a second stage. This approach has already
been suggested in Branzˆ ei et al. (2002). The problem with this procedure is that the speciﬁc characteristics
of the penalty function may be neglected. We show the inadequacy of this procedure in the following ex-
ample in which the allocation of the total delay is obtained by considering the core of the game deﬁned in
Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007), which we subsequently recall.
Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r, ˜ K) be a delayed project problem with ˜ K(t) = t if t > 0 and ˜ K(t) = 0 if t ≤ 0.
The associated (linear) delayed project game, (N,˜ c), is deﬁned by
























for S ⊂ N, where P(S) is the set (of indices) of paths in which activities in S are involved, i.e. P(S) = {a ∈
{1,...,m}| Na ∩ S  = ∅}.
Example 3.1. Consider the delayed project problem ({N1,N2},p,r,K) with N1 = {A,C}, N2 = {B,C},
p(A) = 3, p(B) = 5, p(C) = 2, r(A) = 8, r(B) = 9, r(C) = 3, and K(t) = 0 if t ≤ 0, K(t) = t2 if 0 < t ≤ 4,
and K(t) = 2t2 if t > 4. The project is represented in Figure 2 together with the duration of the paths






Na D(Na,p) slack(Na,p) D(Na,r)
AC 5 2 11
BC 7 0 12
Figure 2: Representation of the project in Example 3.1 and durations of the paths.
In this delay problem, D(p) = 7 and D(r) = 12, therefore there is a total delay of D(r) −D(p) = 5, with an
8associated cost of K(5) = 50.
Note that path N1 = {A,C} gives a delay of 11 − 7 = 4 to the project with an associated penalty of
K(4) = 16, while path N2 = {B,C} is responsible of a delay of 12 − 7 = 5 with an associated penalty of
K(5) = 50.
Following the proposed two-stage approach, we ﬁrst share the total delay of 5 among the activities
by making use of the associated linear delayed project game, which coalitional values are: ˜ c({A}) = 4,
˜ c({B}) = 4, ˜ c({C}) = 1, ˜ c({A,B}) = 4, ˜ c({A,C}) = 4, ˜ c({B,C}) = 5, ˜ c(N) = 5. It can be checked that
Core(˜ c) = conv{(0,4,1),(3,1,1)}.
Let us consider (3,1,1) as the allocation of the total delay among the activities. In a second stage, we
divide the total penalty proportionally to this allocation of responsibilities, as suggested in Branzˆ ei et al.
(2002), giving an allocation of (30,10,10). Note that this allocation assigns a total penalty of 30 + 10 = 40
to A and C together, which is more than 16, the penalty associated to the delay induced by N1 = {A,C}. 3
The inadequacy in ﬁrst sharing delay “responsibilities” among the activities and then the penalty in a
second stage is that the characteristics of the penalty function are not reﬂected on the ﬁnal share of the
total penalty. Our approach will follow the opposite reasoning. We ﬁrst allocate the penalty associated to
the gross delay of each path (i.e. the total delay created by its activities, without taking into account the
slack of the path) among its activities. In a second step, we use cooperative games to share the penalty of
the project among all its activities, using the initial allocations as reference points.
If activities in a path are delayed and they cause a delay of the project, we can consider this as a cost
sharing problem where the demands of the activities are their delays and the cost function is the penalty




i = d(i) for every i ∈ Na.
Selecting a cost sharing mechanism y by taking into account the type of penalty function at hand,
we denote by ya the allocation proposed by our mechanism to the cost sharing problem (Na,qa,K), i.e.
ya = y(Na,qa,K). Here, we pessimistically assume that the activities in Na are not allowed to make use
of the planned slack in the path and have to pay the cost associated to their total delay. In this way, ya
i
represents the cost that i is held responsible of for the cost associated to the total delay of the activities in
Na. By using these allocations as starting points, we associate a delayed project game to a delayed project
problem where the set of players is the set of activities and the cost of a coalition is the maximal amount the
coalition can be held responsible of with respect to the diﬀerent paths involved in the coalition. Formally,
9given a delayed project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,K) and a cost sharing mechanism y, we deﬁne the















   
for every S ⊂ N. Recall that P(S) = {a ∈ {1,...,m}| Na ∩ S  = ∅} represents the set of paths in which
activities of S are involved.
The game pessimistically assigns to a coalition the maximum penalty that the coalition can be held
responsible of, taking into account that the activities in a path should never pay more than neither their
initial allocation in the path nor the penalty associated to the net delay of the path (i.e. the total delay of
the activities in the path minus the planned slack of the path).
Example 3.2. Consider the delayed project problem given in Example 3.1. Recall that N1 = {A,C},
N2 = {B,C}, p(A) = 3, p(B) = 5, p(C) = 2, r(A) = 8, r(B) = 9, r(C) = 3, and K(t) = 0 if t ≤ 0,
K(t) = t2 if 0 < t ≤ 4, and K(t) = 2t2 if t > 4. Note that d(A) = 5, d(B) = 4, d(C) = 1. As cost
sharing mechanism, we take the serial cost sharing mechanism, then y1 = y({A,C},(5,1),K) = (70,2) and
y2 = y({B,C},(4,1),K) = (48,2). Table 5 gives the values of the associated delayed project game.
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
cy(S) 16 48 2 48 16 50 50
Table 5: Values of the delayed project game in Example 3.2.
Next, we show how to compute the value of coalition {A,C}. Note that P(S) = {1,2} since A,C ∈ N1
and C ∈ N2. Then,
cy({A,C}) = max{min{y1
A + y1
C,K(5 + 1 − 2)}, min{y2
C,K(4 + 1 − 0)}}
= max{min{70 + 2,16}, min{2,50}}
= max{16,2} = 16.
It can be checked that the core of the game is Core(cy) = conv{(0,48,2),(14,34,2)}. Note that this game
is not concave by taking i = B, S = {A}, and T = {A,C}. 3
Given a delayed project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,K) and a cost sharing mechanism y, the associated
delayed project game, (N,cy), can be described as the maximum of as many taxation games as paths in the
project, where the taxation problem associated to path a ∈ {1,...,m} is
(N,Ea,cy,a) (3.1)
with Ea = K(
 
i∈Na d(i) − slack(Na,p)), c
y,a
i = ya
i if i ∈ Na and c
y,a
i = 0 otherwise.
10Theorem 3.1. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,K) be a delayed project problem, let y be a cost sharing mechanism,




for every S ⊂ N.














































where the second equality is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnitions of cy,a and Ea, the third one follows
because c
y,a
i = 0 for every i ∈ N \Na, and the last equality is a direct consequence of c(N,Ea,cy,a)(S) = 0 for
every a ∈ {1,...,m} \ P(S) since c
y,a
i = 0 for every i ∈ Na with a ∈ {1,...,m} \ P(S). 2
Example 3.3. Consider the delayed project game in Example 3.2. Associated to each path Na we have a
taxation problem (N,Ea,cy,a):
N1 = {A,C}, E1 = K(5 + 1 − 2) = 16, cy,1 = (y1
A,0,y1
C) = (70,0,2),
N2 = {B,C}, E2 = K(4 + 1 − 0) = 50, cy,2 = (0,y2
B,y2
C) = (0,48,2).
Table 6 gives the values of the corresponding taxation games and delayed project game. 3
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
c(N,E1,c1)(S) 16 0 2 16 16 2 16
c(N,E2,c2)(S) 0 48 2 48 2 50 50
cy(S) 16 48 2 48 16 50 50
Table 6: Values of the taxation games and delayed project game in Example 3.3.
Theorem 3.2. Delayed project games have a nonempty core.
11Proof: Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,K) be a delayed project problem and let y be a cost sharing mechanism. Let
¯ a ∈ {1,...,m} be such that cy(N) = c(N,E¯ a,cy,¯ a)(N). The core of (N,c(N,E¯ a,cy,¯ a)) is nonempty since taxation
games are concave, then we can take x ∈ Core(c(N,E¯ a,cy,¯ a)) and
 
i∈N
xi = c(N,E¯ a,cy,¯ a)(N) = cy(N) (3.2)
where the ﬁrst equality follows by deﬁnition of core element and the second one by assumption. Moreover,
for every S ⊂ N we have
 
i∈S
xi ≤ c(N,E¯ a,cy,¯ a)(S) ≤ max
a∈{1,...,m}
{c(N,Ea,cy,a)(S)} = cy(S) (3.3)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows by deﬁnition of core element and the equality is a direct consequence of
Lemma 3.1. By equations (3.2) and (3.3) we have that x ∈ Core(cy). 2
4 Expedited project games
An expedited project problem forms when the planned time of the activities was overestimated, i.e. the
real time of an activity is at most its planned time, bringing expedition to the project. Associated to the
expedition of the project, we have a non-decreasing reward function R : R → R+ satisfying R(t) = 0 for every
t ≤ 0. An expedited project problem can be then described by a 4-tuple ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) where p and
r satisfy p ≥ r. At this stage, one may think about using the duality between delayed and expedited project
problems: an expedited project problem can be viewed as a delayed project problem by interchanging the
planned and real time vectors. This dual approach however is inadequate to solve expedited project games.
For an example see Example 4.1 in Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007).
As in the case of delayed project problems, when a reward arises due to an expedition of the project,
one can think of sharing the expedition of the project among the activities in a ﬁrst (linear) stage, and
allocating the (possibly nonlinear) reward among the activities according to the expedition they have been
held responsible of in a second stage. Similarly to delayed project problems, this approach may be inadequate
since the speciﬁc characteristics of the reward function may be disregarded in the ﬁnal allocation of the total
reward.
In deﬁning expedited project games, we follow the ideas in Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007). Before
starting with the description of expedited project games, we give the following example that illustrates the
ideas behind the model.
Example 4.1. Consider the expedited project problem ({N1,N2,N3},p,r,R) with N1 = {A,B}, N2 = {C},
N3 = {D}, p(A) = 9, p(B) = 12, p(C) = 17, p(D) = 16, r(A) = 6, r(B) = 8, r(C) = 15, r(D) = 13, and
12R(t) = 0 if t ≤ 0, R(t) = t4 if 0 < t ≤ 4, and R(t) = t2 +240 if t > 4. The project is represented in Figure 3







Na D(Na,p) slack(Na,p) D(Na,r)
AB 21 0 14
C 17 4 15
D 16 5 13
Figure 3: Representation of the project in Example 4.1 and durations of the paths.
In this expedited project problem, D(p) = 21 and D(r) = 15, therefore there is a total expedition of
D(p) − D(r) = 6 and a reward of R(6) = 276.
Note that the critical path N1 = {A,B} is indispensable to expedite the project. We subsequently explain
how this expedition is achieved. First, suppose that only the activities in N1 act according to realization while
activities in N2 and N3 act according to plan, then the project is expedited in 4 with an associated reward
of R(4) = 256, N2 becomes critical, and N3 has a slack of 1. Note that N1 is responsible by itself of a reward
of 256 and that N2 becomes indispensable to continue expediting. Second, suppose that only the activities
in N1 and N2 act according to realization while activities in N3 act according to plan, then the project is
expedited in one extra unit of time with an associated marginal reward of R(5)−R(4) = 265−256 = 9, and
N3 becomes critical. Note that N1 and N2 are exclusively responsible of an extra reward of 9 and that N3
becomes indispensable to continue expediting. Finally, suppose that all activities act according to realization,
then there is an additional expedition of 1 with a marginal reward of R(6)−R(5) = 276−265 = 11 of which
N1, N2, and N3 are responsible. The contribution of the paths to the reward obtained by the expedition of
the project is summarized in Table 7.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
N1 256 9 11
N2 0 9 11
N3 0 0 11
Table 7: Durations of the paths in Example 4.1.
Note that the sum of the ﬁrst row gives the total reward. This type of decomposition into levels of expedition
plays an important role in the deﬁnition of expedited project games. 3
In order to solve expedited project problems, we ﬁrst optimistically allocate the part of the expedition
that each path could contribute to among its activities. In a second step, we use cooperative games to share
13the total reward among all the activities in the project using for this the initial allocations as reference
points.
Before deﬁning expedited project games, we need to introduce some notation. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R)
be an expedited project problem. We denote by I1 the set (of indices) of critical paths according to the
planned time. Formally,
I1 = {a ∈ {1,...,m}| slack(Na,p) = 0}.
Recursively, we deﬁne for k ≥ 2,
Ik =
 
a ∈ {1,...,m} \
k−1  
l=1






i.e. Ik corresponds to all paths that would be critical in the (sub)project if all the paths in I1,...,Ik−1
were not present. By slack(Ik) we denote the slack of the paths in Ik according to the planned time, i.e.
slack(Ik) = slack(Na,p) for each a ∈ Ik. Let h ≥ 1 be such that slack(Ih) < D(p) − D(r) ≤ slack(Ih+1).
For k = 1,...,h, we deﬁne Fk as the marginal contribution of the paths in I1,...,Ik to the total reward





R(slack(Ik+1)) − R(slack(Ik)) if 1 ≤ k < h;
R(D(p) − D(r)) − R(slack(Ih)) if k = h.
Note that
 h
k=1 Fk = R(D(p) − D(r)) since R(slack(I1)) = 0.
Next, we deﬁne the maximal amount of reward that an activity can claim for itself. For this, we consider
for each a ∈ {1,...,m} the surplus sharing problem
(Na,pa,Ra)
with pa





R(t + slack(Na,p)) − R(slack(Na,p)) if t ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
Selecting a surplus sharing mechanism z (taking into account the type of reward function at hand), we
denote by za the allocation proposed by our mechanism to the surplus sharing problem (Na,pa,Ra), i.e.
za = z(Na,pa,Ra). Here, za
i is the maximum amount that i can claim according to the surplus sharing
mechanism if its path is awarded with the total expedition that it can bring to the project. Then, we







i is the maximum reward that activity i can claim from the expedition of the project when the surplus
sharing mechanism z is considered.
Following the underlying ideas in Est´ evez-Fern´ andez et al. (2007), to an expedited project problem we
associate an expedited project game where the set of players is the set of activities and the value of a coalition
is the sum over all k ∈ {1,...,h} of those speciﬁc parts of the contribution to the total reward Fk for which
the activities outside the coalition that are in paths of
 k
l=1 Il cannot be held responsible for anymore at
that phase. Formally, given an expedited project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) we deﬁne the associated








for every S ⊂ N, where for all k ∈ {1,...,h}, wk
















where NIl := ∪a∈IlNa. Here, wk
z(S) represents the part of the contribution to the total reward Fk that
players in S maximally would have to concede to players in the paths corresponding to
 k
l=1 Il outside S,
taking into account earlier concessions from the previous phases. Note that wk
z is non-negative. Moreover,
vz(N) equals the total expedition of the project because wk
z(N) = 0 for any k ∈ {1,...,h}.
Example 4.2. Consider the expedited project problem given in Example 4.1. Recall that the problem
was given by ({N1,N2,N3},p,r,K) with N1 = {A,B}, N2 = {C}, and N3 = {D}, p(A) = 9, p(B) = 12,
p(C) = 17, p(D) = 16, r(A) = 6, r(B) = 8, r(C) = 15, r(D) = 13, and R(t) = 0 if t ≤ 0, R(t) = t4 if
0 < t ≤ 4, and R(t) = t2 + 240 if t > 4.
Here, D(p) = 21 and D(r) = 15, and then the total expedition is D(p) − D(r) = 6 with an associated
reward of R(6) = 276. Besides, e(A) = 3, e(B) = 4, e(C) = 2 and e(D) = 3; I1 = {1}, I2 = {2}, and I3 = {3};
h = 3; F1 = R(4) − R(0) = 256, F2 = R(5) − R(4) = 9, and F3 = R(6) − R(5) = 11.
For the computation of fz, we consider the serial surplus sharing mechanism. Associated to each path
Na we have the surplus problem:
(N1,p1,R1): N1 = {A,B}, p1 = (3,4), R1 = R, and then z1 = (138,151),




R(t + 4) − R(4) if t ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
and then z2 = (20),




R(t + 5) − R(5) if t ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
and then z3 = (39),
15which gives fz = (138,151,20,39).





































= (256 − 151) + (9 − 0) + (11 − 11) = 114.
All coalitional values are given in Table 8.
S {A} {B} {C} {D} {A,B} {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D}
vz(S) 105 118 0 0 256 114 105 127 118 0
S {A,B,C} {A,B,D} {A,C,D} {B,C,D} {A,B,C,D}
vz(S) 265 256 125 138 276
Table 8: Values of the expedited project game in Example 4.2. 3
Given an expedited project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) and a surplus sharing mechanism z, the
associated project game (N,vz) can be expressed as the maximum of as many bankruptcy games as levels of
expedition in the project, where the bankruptcy problem associated to level of expedition k ∈ {1,...,h} is
(N,Ek,cz,k) (4.1)
with Ek = R(slack(Ik+1)) if k < h and Eh = R(D(p) − D(r)), and c
z,k
i = fz





Theorem 4.1. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) be an expedited project problem, let z be a surplus sharing mech-




for every S ⊂ N.
Proof: We proceed by induction on h. Let h = 1 and S ⊂ N, then
vz(S) = F1 − w1































































































































































where the fourth equality follows by induction, the ﬁfth one is a consequence of maxk∈{1,...,h−1}{v(N,Ek,cz,k)(S)}
≥ 0, and the sixth one follows because
 h




i if i ∈
 h
k=1 NIk and c
z,h
i = 0 otherwise. 2
Example 4.3. Consider the expedited project game in Example 4.2. Associated to each level of expedition
Ik we have a bankruptcy problem (N,Ek,cz,k):
E1 = R(slack(I2)) = R(4) = 256, cz,1 = (fz
A,fz
B,0,0) = (138,151,0,0),









Table 9 gives the values of the corresponding bankruptcy games and expedited project game. 3





i for every i ∈ N and every k′ ≤ k. For U ⊂ N,
let ˆ k(U,vz) denote the smallest index satisfying vz(U) = v(N,E
ˆ k(U,vz),cz,ˆ k(U,vz))(U), i.e.
ˆ k(U,vz) = min{k ∈ {1,...,h}| vz(U) = v(N,Ek,cz,k)(U)}.
17S {A} {B} {C} {D} {A,B} {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D}
v(N,E1,cz,1)(S) 105 118 0 0 256 105 105 118 118 0
v(N,E2,cz,2)(S) 94 107 0 0 245 114 94 127 107 0
v(N,E3,cz,3)(S) 66 79 0 0 217 86 105 99 118 0
vz(S) 105 118 0 0 256 114 105 127 118 0
S {A,B,C} {A,B,D} {A,C,D} {B,C,D} {A,B,C,D}
v(N,E1,cz,1)(S) 256 256 105 118 256
v(N,E2,cz,2)(S) 265 245 114 127 265
v(N,E3,cz,3)(S) 237 256 125 138 276
vz(S) 265 256 125 138 276
Table 9: Values of the bankruptcy games and expedited project game in Example 4.3.
Lemma 4.2. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) be an expedited project problem and let z be a cost sharing mecha-
nism. Then, ˆ k(S,vz) ≤ ˆ k(T,vz) for every S ⊂ T ⊂ N.



























































































































18which contradicts the deﬁnition of ˆ k(T,vz). Here, the ﬁrst and second equalities follow by deﬁnition of
ˆ k(T,vz) and v(N,E
ˆ k(T,vz),c
ˆ k(T,vz))(T), respectively. The second inequality follows because ˆ k(T,vz) < ˆ k(S,vz),
and then vz(S) = v(N,E
ˆ k(S,vz),c
ˆ k(S,vz))(S) > v(N,E
ˆ k(T,vz),c
ˆ k(T,vz))(S) by deﬁnition of ˆ k(S,vz), together with
vz(S) > 0. The last inequality follows because ˆ k(T,vz) < ˆ k(S,vz), and then c
ˆ k(T,vz) ≤ c
ˆ k(S,vz) by deﬁnition





j ≥ 0 and c
ˆ k(S,vz) ≥ 0. 2
Theorem 4.3. Expedited project games are convex.
Proof: Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) be an expedited project problem, let z be a cost sharing mechanism, and
let (N,vz) be the associated expedited project game. Since z is ﬁxed, we denote cz,k by ck. Let i ∈ N and
S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i}, we have to show that vz(S ∪ {i}) − vz(S) ≤ vz(T ∪ {i}) − vz(T).
If vz(S ∪ {i}) − vz(S) = 0 or vz(S) = vz(T), then the condition is satisﬁed by monotonicity of (N,vz).
We can then assume without loss of generality that vz(S ∪ {i}) > vz(S) and vz(T) > vz(S). Note that then
vz(S ∪ {i}) > 0 and vz(T) > 0 since vz is nonnegative. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: ˆ k(S ∪ {i},vz) ≤ ˆ k(T,vz). Then,













































































= vz(T ∪ {i}) − vz(T)
where the ﬁrst equality is a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of ˆ k applied to S ∪ {i} and S and because
v(S ∪ {i}) > v(S)(≥ 0) by assumption; the ﬁrst inequality follows by deﬁnition of ˆ k applied to coalition
S; the second inequality is a direct consequence of (x)+ = max{0,x}; the third inequality follows because
ˆ k(S ∪ {i},vz) ≤ ˆ k(T,vz) and by deﬁnition of ck we have c
ˆ k(S∪{i},vz) ≤ c
ˆ k(T,vz); the last inequality follows
by deﬁnition of ˆ k applied to coalition T ∪ {i} and vz(T ∪ {i}) ≥ vz(T) > 0; and the last equality is a direct
consequence of the deﬁnition of ˆ k and vz(T ∪ {i}) ≥ vz(T) > 0 by assumption.
Case 2: ˆ k(S ∪ {i},vz) > ˆ k(T,vz). In this case we show that the equivalent condition vz(S ∪ {i}) + vz(T) ≤
19vz(T ∪ {i}) + vz(S) is satisﬁed.














































































































































= vz(T ∪ {i}) + vz(S),
where the ﬁrst equality is a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of ˆ k applied to S ∪ {i} and T together
with the assumption vz(S ∪ {i}) > vz(S)(≥ 0); the second inequality follows by deﬁnition of ˆ k applied
to S; the third inequality is a direct consequence of ˆ k(T,vz) < ˆ k(S ∪ {i},vz) and by deﬁnition of ck we
have c
ˆ k(T,vz) ≤ c
ˆ k(S∪{i},vz); the fourth inequality follows by deﬁnition of ˆ k applied to coalition T ∪ {i} and
vz(T ∪ {i}) ≥ vz(T) > 0; ﬁnally, the last equality follows by deﬁnition of ˆ k together with vz(T ∪ {i}) ≥
vz(S ∪ {i})(> 0) by monotonicity of vz. 2
5 Project games
A project problem arises when the planned time of the activities has been incorrectly estimated, possibly
bringing delay or expedition to the project. A non-decreasing reward function R : R → R is associated to
the diﬀerence between the planned and real times of the project, satisfying R(t) ≤ 0 for t < 0, R(t) = 0 for
t = 0, and R(t) ≥ 0 for t > 0. A project problem can be described by a 4-tuple ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) where
p and r satisfy p  = r.
Associated to a project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) we deﬁne a project game where the set of players
is the set of activities and the value of a coalition combines the underlying ideas from Sections 3 and 4. In
determining the value of a coalition we pessimistically assume that all delayed activities have indeed acted
20according to realization and that all expedited activities outside the coalition have acted according to plan.
Then, if the expedition given by the expedited activities in the coalition itself is not enough to expedite the
duration of the project, the value of the coalition is negative and is determined along the lines of delayed
project games. Otherwise, the value of the coalition is positive and is determined along the lines of expedited
project games. Formally, given a project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R), a cost sharing mechanism y, and a
surplus sharing mechanism z, we denote by (N,uyz) the associated project game, still to be deﬁned formally.
Let E denote the set of expedited activities, i.e. E = {i ∈ N| e(i) > 0}.
If D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) ≥ D(p), then the expedition carried by the expedited activities in S is not enough
to expedite the project and ¯ cy(S) reﬂects the maximum delay the coalition can be held responsible of. For
every a ∈ {1,...,m}, consider the cost sharing problem
(Na,qa,K)
with qa
i = d(i) for every i ∈ Na and K(t) = −R(−t) if t > 0 and K(t) = 0 otherwise. Let ya = y(Na,qa,K),
then coalition S cannot be held responsible neither for more than the total cost assigned to it by the cost
sharing mechanism, nor for more than the net delay of the path as a consequence of the delay of activities
in the path and the expedition of the activities within the coalition. Formally,
















   
. (5.1)
If D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) < D(p), then the expedition carried by the expedited activities in S is enough to
expedite the project and ¯ vz(S) reﬂects the amount of reward from the expedition that the coalition may
claim. In order to deﬁne ¯ vz(S) we need to introduce some notation.
We denote by rslack(Na,p,r) the amount of remaining slack of a path with respect to the planned duration
if only its delayed activities act according to realization, i.e. rslack(Na,p,r) = slack(Na,p) −
 
i∈Na d(i).
Note that rslack(Na,p,r) can be negative, meaning that the delayed activities have consumed all the initial
slack and would produce a delay on the project, as a whole, of −rslack(Na,p,r) if the expedited activities
had acted according to plan. We denote by J1 the set (of indexes) of paths with remaining slack less than
or equal to zero:
J1 = {a ∈ {1,...,m}| rslack(Na,p,r) ≤ 0}.
Recursively, we deﬁne for k ≥ 2
Jk =
 
a ∈ {1,...,m} \
k−1  
l=1






i.e. Jk contains all paths that would have smallest remaining slack if the paths in J1,...,Jk−1 where not
present. Set rslack(J1) := 0 and let rslack(Jk) denote the remaining slack of the paths in Jk for k ≥ 2, i.e.
21rslack(Jk) = rslack(Na,p,r) for each a ∈ Jk, k ≥ 2. Let g be such that rslack(Jg) < D(p) − D(r) ≤
rslack(Jg+1) if D(p) − D(r) > 0 and g = 0 otherwise. For k = 1,...,g, we deﬁne Fk as the marginal





R(rslack(Jk+1)) − R(rslack(Jk)) if 1 ≤ k < g;
R(D(p) − D(r)) − R(rslack(Jg)) if k = g.
Note that
 g
k=1 Fk = R(D(p) − D(r)) since R(rslack(J1)) = 0.
For every a ∈ {1,...,m}, consider the surplus sharing problem
(Na,pa,Ra)
with pa
i = e(i) for every i ∈ Na and Ra(t) = R(t + (rslack(Na,p))+) − R((rslack(Na,p))+) if t ≥ 0 and
Ra(t) = 0 otherwise.
Let za = z(Na,pa,Ra). Similarly as in Section 4, za
i is the maximum amount that i can claim according
to the surplus sharing mechanism if its path is awarded with the total expedition that it can bring to the







i is the maximum reward that activity i can claim from the expedition of the project when the surplus
sharing mechanism z is considered.
Next, we deﬁne ¯ vz(S) representing the sum over all k = 1,...,g of those speciﬁc parts of the corresponding
level of expedition Fk for which expedited activities outside the coalition that are in paths of
 k
l=1 Jl cannot










z(S) represents the part of the level of expedition Fk that players in S maximally would have to
concede to players in
 k




















for all k ∈ {1,...,g}, where NJl =
 
a∈Jl Na.





−¯ cy(S), if D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) ≥ D(p);
¯ vz(S), if D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) < D(p).
(5.5)
for every S ⊂ N.
22Note that if the project problem is a delayed project problem, then ¯ cy = cy and uyz = −cy since
D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) = D(r) ≥ D(p). Besides, if the project problem is an expedited project problem, then
¯ vz = vz and uyz = vz since, for all S ⊂ N, D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) ≥ D(p) implies vz(S) = 0(= uyz(S)).
Given a project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R), and a surplus sharing mechanism z, the corresponding
game (N, ¯ vz) can be described as the maximum of as many bankruptcy games as levels of expedition in the
project, where the bankruptcy problem associated to level of expedition k ∈ {1,...,g} is
(N, ¯ Ek,¯ ck)
with ¯ Ek = R(rslack(Jk+1)) if k < g and ¯ Eg = R(D(p) − D(r)), and ¯ ck
i = fz
i if i ∈ ∪k
l=1NJl and ¯ ck
i = 0
otherwise. Besides, it turns out that (N, ¯ vz) is convex. The proofs of both results follow the same lines of
those in Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 and are therefore omitted.
Lemma 5.1. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) be a project problem and let z be a surplus sharing mechanism.
Then, (N, ¯ vz) is convex and
¯ vz(S) = max
k∈{1,...,g}
{v(N, ¯ Ek,¯ ck)(S)}
for every S ⊂ N.
The following example illustrates the computation of a project game.
Example 5.1. Consider the expedited project problem ({N1,N2,N3},p,r,R) with N1 = {A,B}, N2 =
{A,D}, N3 = {C,D}, p(A) = 10, p(B) = 20, p(C) = 15, p(D) = 15, r(A) = 12, r(B) = 7, r(C) = 16,







Na D(Na,p) slack(Na,p) D(Na,r)
AB 30 0 19
AD 25 5 20
CD 30 0 24
Figure 4: Representation of the project given in Example 4.1 and duration of the paths.
Here, D(p) = 30 and D(r) = 24, and then the total expedition is D(p) − D(r) = 6 with an associated
reward of R(6) = 236. Besides, d(A) = 2, d(B) = 0, d(C) = 1 and d(D) = 0; e(A) = 0, e(B) = 13, e(C) = 0
and e(D) = 7; rslack(AB,p,r) = −2, rslack(AD,p,r) = 3, rslack(CD,p,r) = −1; J1 = {1,3} and J2 = {2};
F1 = R(3) − R(0) = 209 and F2 = R(6) − R(3) = 27.
23For the computation of (N,uyz), we ﬁrst compute (N,¯ cy) and (N, ¯ vz). For the computation of (N, ¯ cy)
we use the serial cost sharing mechanism. Associated to each path Na, we have the cost sharing pro-
blem (Na,qa,K) with qa
i = d(i) and K(t) = 0 if t ≤ 0 and K(t) = t4 + 100 if t > 0. Then, y1 =
y({A,B},(2,0),K) = (116,0), y2 = y({A,D},(2,0),K) = (116,0), and y3 = y({C,D},(1,0),K) = (101,0).
For the computation of (N, ¯ vz) we use the serial surplus sharing mechanism. Associated to each path Na
we have the surplus problem:
(N1,p1,R1): N1 = {A,B}, p1 = (0,13), R1(t) = R(t) if t ≥ 0 and R1(t) = 0 otherwise, and z1 = (0,369),




R(t + 3) − R(3) if t ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
z2 = (0,91),
(N3,p3,R3): N3 = {C,D}, p3 = (0,7), R3(t) = R(t) if t ≥ 0 and R3(t) = 0 otherwise, and z3 = (0,249),
which gives fz = (0,369,0,249). All coalitional values are given in Table 10.
S {A} {B} {C} {D} {A,B} {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D}
D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) 32 31 32 32 31 32 32 31 24 32
¯ cy(S) 116 0 101 0 0 116 116 101 0 0
¯ vz(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 236 0
uyz(S) −116 0 −101 0 0 −116 −116 −101 236 0
S {A,B,C} {A,B,D} {A,C,D} {B,C,D} {A,B,C,D}
D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) 31 24 32 24 24
¯ cy(S) 101 0 116 0 0
¯ vz(S) 0 236 0 236 236
uyz(S) −101 236 −116 236 236
Table 10: Computation of the cost sharing rule in Example 4.2.
It can be checked that the core of the game is
Core(uyz) = conv{ (−15,135,−101,217),(−116,236,0,116),(0,0,0,236),
(−116,352,0,0),(−15,251,−101,101),(0,236,0,0)}
Note that this game is not convex by taking i = D, S = {C}, and T = {A,C}. 3
Theorem 5.2. Project games have a nonempty core.
Proof: Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) be a project problem, let y and z be a cost and surplus sharing mechanism,
respectively, and let (N,uyz) be the associated project game. We distinguish between two cases.
24Case 1: D(p) ≤ D(r).
In this case, D(p) ≤ D(r) ≤ D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) for every S ⊂ N, and therefore uyz(S) = −¯ cy(S) for every
S ⊂ N. Consequently, (N,uyz) has a nonempty core if and only if (N,¯ cy) has a nonempty core.
Let ˆ a ∈ {1,...,m} be such that D(r) = D(Nˆ a,r), i.e. Nˆ a is responsible of the total delay of the project.




i∈Nˆ a e(i)−slack(Nˆ a,p)), cˆ a
i = yˆ a
i
if i ∈ Nˆ a and cˆ a
i = 0 if i ∈ N \ Nˆ a. Then,







































= c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)(N)
where the second equality follows because D(r) = D(Nˆ a,r) and the third one is a direct consequence of the
deﬁnition of Eˆ a and cˆ a. Moreover, for any S ⊂ N we have























































= c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)(S)
where the second inequality follows because R is nondecreasing and therefore K is also nondecreasing, and
the second equality is a direct consequence of the deﬁnitions of Eˆ a and cˆ a.
Since (Nˆ a,c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)) is concave, we know that there is an x ∈ Core(c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)). Then,
 
i∈N xi =
c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)(N) = ¯ cy(N) and
 
i∈S xi ≤ c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)(S) ≤ ¯ cy(S) for every S ⊂ N, and therefore x ∈ Core(¯ cy).
Case 2: D(p) < D(r).
In this case, uyz(N) = ¯ vz(N) and uyz(S) ≤ ¯ vz(S) for every S ⊂ N. By Lemma 5.1 we know that
(N, ¯ vz) is convex and therefore Core(¯ vz)  = ∅. Let x ∈ Core(¯ vz), then
 
i∈N xi = ¯ vz(N) = uyz(N) and
 
i∈S xi ≥ ¯ vz(S) ≥ uyz(S) for every S ⊂ N, and therefore x ∈ Core(uyz). 2
25We now show that the core of project games satisﬁes some basic and desirable properties for solutions of
project problems.
In many project problems the general manager of the project does not have legal authority to oblige
delayed activities to compensate expedited activities for their contribution to decrease the total delay of the
project. In this situation, a set-valued solution should satisfy: if the project is neither delayed, nor expedited,
then there should be a solution in which nobody is neither punished, nor rewarded, i.e. if D(r) = D(p), then
the zero vector should be a possible solution; if the project is delayed, then there should be a solution in which
the delayed activities pay exactly the total cost associated to the total delay, i.e. expedited activities are not
compensated; if the project is expedited, then there should be a solution in which the delayed activities don’t
have to compensate expedited activities, i.e. expedited activities get exactly the total reward associated to
the total expedition.
Let D be the set of delayed activities, i.e. D = {i ∈ N|p(i) < r(i)}, and recall that E is the set of
expedited activities, i.e. E = {i ∈ N|p(i) > r(i)}.
Theorem 5.3. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r,R) be a project problem, let y and z be a cost and surplus sharing
mechanism, respectively, and let (N,uyz) be the associated project game.
(i) If D(p) < D(r), then there exist x ∈ Core(uyz) such that xi = 0 for every i ∈ N \ D.
(ii) If D(p) = D(r), then 0 ∈ Core(uyz).
(iii) If D(p) > D(r), then there exist x ∈ Core(uyz) such that xi = 0 for every i ∈ N \ E.
Proof: (i) If D(p) < D(r), then D(p) ≤ D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) ≤ D(r) for every S ⊂ N, and therefore
uyz(S) = −¯ cy(S) for every S ⊂ N. Let ˆ a ∈ {1,...,m} be such that D(r) = D(Nˆ a,r), i.e. Nˆ a is responsible
of the total delay of the project. Consider the taxation problem (N,Eˆ a,cˆ a) given by Eˆ a = K(
 
i∈Nˆ a d(i) −
 
i∈Nˆ a e(i)−slack(Nˆ a,p)), cˆ a
i = yˆ a
i if i ∈ Nˆ a and cˆ a
i = 0 if i ∈ N \Nˆ a. Note that cˆ a
i = 0 for every i ∈ Nˆ a \D.
By the proof of Theorem 5.2 we know that Core(c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)) ⊂ Core(¯ cy). Moreover, it is well known that any
x ∈ Core(c(N,Eˆ a,cˆ a)) satisﬁes 0 ≤ x ≤ cˆ a, and therefore xi = 0 for every i ∈ N \ (Nˆ a ∩ D).
(ii) If D(p) = D(r), then D(p) ≤ D(p|E\S,r|N\(E\S)) ≤ D(r) for every S ⊂ N, and therefore uyz(S) =
−¯ cy(S) ≤ 0 for every S ⊂ N. Moreover, uyz(N) = 0, and then 0 ∈ Core(uyz).
(iii) If D(p) > D(r), then uyz(N) = ¯ vz(N) and uyz(S) ≤ ¯ vz(S) for every S ⊂ N. Then, Core(¯ vz) ⊂ Core(uyz).
Since fz
i = 0 for every i ∈ N \ E, we have ¯ vz(S ∪ {i}) = ¯ vz(S) for every i ∈ N \ E and therefore xi = 0 for
every x ∈ Core(¯ vz) and i ∈ N \ E. 2
266 Final remarks
We have used cooperative games to ﬁnd solutions to project problems. The associated project game, in our
opinion, provides an adequate thought experiment to evaluate coalitional inﬂuence and the core of this game
provides a suitable answer to the allocation problem at hand.
Contrary to our focus on ﬁnding suitable allocations satisfying some basic properties, Castro, G´ omez
and Tejada (2007) concentrate on ﬁnding a game related to project problems satisfying some “desirable”
properties. They put forward the properties of separability, non-manipulability by splitting, and independent
slack and propose a cooperative game to share the total delay or expedition of a project satisfying these three
properties. One can question the desirability of these three properties when we concentrate on the allocation
of the rewards (or penalties) created by a project that has not performed as planned. For instance, the
property of separability says that if a project can be decomposed in two diﬀerent (sub)projects (i.e. if there
is a node used by all paths in the project), then the associated game can be decomposed as the sum of
the two games associated to the two corresponding (sub)projects. Note that the total reward of the project
does not need to equal the sum of the rewards of the (sub)projects since we allow for non additive reward
functions too. Hence, in our setting, separability does not need to be satisﬁed by project problems, let alone
by the associated games.
In our opinion, it is not the properties of the game as a whole that are relevant, but rather the properties
of the derived solutions (except of course from adequately modeling the coalitional possibilities).
As mentioned above, Castro, G´ omez and Tejada (2007) deﬁne a cooperative game to share the total
delay or expedition of a project. If one uses the core of this game to share the total reward in a project
problem where the reward function is proportional to the total expedition or delay of the project, one
encounters unwanted features in the allocations proposed by the core. It turns out that for projects in which
the corresponding graph is a line, the game in Castro et al. (2007) is additive (i.e. the value of a coalition
equals the sum of the individual values of its members). Therefore, the core of this game does not need to
satisfy any of the properties proposed in Section 5.
Example 6.1. Consider the project problem ({N1},p,r,R) with N1 = {A,B}, p(A) = 10, p(B) = 15,
r(A) = 13, r(B) = 12, and R(t) = t. The project is represented in Figure 5.
b b b
A B
Figure 5: Representation of the project in Example 6.1.
In this problem, D(p)−D(r) = 0, d(A) = 2, d(B) = 0, e(A) = 0, e(B) = 2, the values of their corresponding
game are v({A}) = −2, v({B}) = 2, v({A,B}) = 0, and Core(v) = {(−2,2)}. 3
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